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Abstract 
Recent advances in intrusions and attacks reflect vulnerabilities in computer networks. Innovative methods and 
tools can help attack defenses, prevent attack propagations, detect and respond to such attacks in a timely manner. 
Intrusion detection and prevention systems search for unauthorized use, recognize anomalous behavior, and 
prevent attempts to deny services.  These systems gather and analyze information from the network, identify 
possible breaches of the security profile, as well as misuses. We have been experimenting with methods for 
introducing important concepts related to intrusion detection and improving undergraduate research experiences 
and education. To achieve this goal, probabilistic models are introduced to students in computer, information 
system and network security courses. This article presents a set of probabilistic methods and statistical models 
for network traffic anomaly detection. It also describes some prospects and how models have ripened from 
theories to big data analysis applications.   
Keywords: Intrusion, conditional probability, network system, regression, data analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
Providing an extensive use of computers and network systems for legitimate activities, searching for 
unauthorized use, recognizing anomalous behavior, and preventing any attempts to deny users, machines, or 
portions of the network access to services are the tasks of intrusion detection systems (IDSs). The purpose of an 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to gather and analyze information from various components within a 
computer or network, identifying possible breaches of the security profile, including unauthorized access as well 
as any other misuses. There are two types of IDSs: Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) and Host-
Based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS). The monitoring approach is a primary factor in classifying the 
different types of IDSs. HIDS find suspicious activity or known attack patterns on the specific host where they 
occurred. NIDS gather data from the network traffic stream as it travels through the network components. 
Network traffic anomaly detection is to search and identify unauthorized activities of the network system. 
Potential users of these systems need to be aware including how well a given system is able to find intruders. 
This also includes determining the amount of work required to maintain a similar system in a fully-functioning 
network capacity allowing a significant volume of daily network traffic to occur. Researchers wanted to identify 
which prototypical attacks can be possible by the systems. Without accessing the nature of normal traffic 
generated by day-to-day work, they are unable to describe how well their systems could detect potential attacks 
while using background traffic information and avoiding false alarms. This information is critical as every 
intrusion requires time to review, regardless of whether it is a correct detection for which a real intrusion has 
occurred, or whether it is merely a false alarm as such the analyses of possible probabilistic and statistical 
models of variables employed. 
This article begins with an example of network worm epidemics modeling. Section 3 describes the use of Bayes’ 
theorem to outline scenarios under the systems accuracies that occur followed by a mean and standard deviation 
model. Point and interval estimations take the center stage describing possible techniques to estimate parameters 
of the models. The multivariate model will be broken down to include multiple regression, the regression model 
for scoring function, and data warehouse & model generator. The Markov process model and time series model 
will be given additional consideration thereafter. Lastly, conclusions and future work will provide a summary of 
the article together with possible undertakings as envisaged. 
 
2. Network Modeling - Worm Epidemics 
A simple example relates to a recent Federal criminal case in which documents provided by the prosecution 
counted the number of e-mail messages generated by a worm transmission. The payload of this worm was a 4kb 
packet. The network of the institution where the defendant worked could process packets at the rate of 1 Gb per 
second. To saturate the network, the worm would have to produce a minimum of 250,000 emails per second. 
According to the prosecution’s data, only 261 e-mails were released into the network during the 3 hours the 
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worm was active. This number was not sufficient to degrade the performance of the network and the defendant 
was cleared. The spreading rate of this worm was hindered due to the strange file name given to the attachment, 
which was not attractive enough for many users to open. This knowledge can be expanded by examining 
epidemiological models. 
 
Epidemics can be represented using a linear equation with a constant propagation rate, a non-linear equation with 
exponential growth rate, a differential equation or a difference equation.  To obtain a useful prediction model, 
one should record the observations of all variables that may significantly affect the response to the epidemic. By 
virtue of its wide applicability, the linear model plays a prominent role in this process.  Mathematical models 
express the laws that govern described actions and assumptions together with hypotheses relevant to the 
equations established within a study. For example, the uninfected computer components in a network under virus 
attack can be represented using (a linear equation or) a differential equation and the initial condition:   
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The general solution of this differential equation is ,)( 0
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−= where the initial uninfected computer 
population is 0y with a constant negative growth rate r− . The geometric representation of this general solution 
is an infinite family of integral curves, one similar to Figure 2-1.  
 
 
Figure 2-1. Decay of Un-Infected Computers                Figure 2-2. Growth of Infected Computers 
Due to a Virus Epidemic                Due to Virus Propagations 
 
A computer worm that randomly scans new hosts to attack and infect may follow the simple epidemiological 
model [1 & 2]. There are other applications that have been used in the past, stemming from pre-existing 
epidemiological, biological, and physical models. Figure 2-2 shows the number of infected computers over time 
due to two different types of attacks. At the initial detection stages, for smaller values of time T , the linear virus 
growth model, ,TR =  shows more infections than the exponential growth .8 )1( −⋅= TTR  This false 
appearance leads us to make the wrong decision to allocate resources and assign a higher priority to suppressing 
the linear attack over the eventually more severe exponential attacks.   
 
In many instances, there is a limit to the possible growth of epidemics. The logistic function models the 
restricted growth phenomenon as an exponential growth. As shown in Figure 2-3 below, the infection growth 
rate slows due to the limited capacity of the network, resulting in a logistic curve.  The red curve to the left with 
the faster infection rate saturates the network sooner than the blue curve to the right. Figure 2-4 depicts the 
infection during an epidemic attack and the recovery due to the response. The growth of the number of infected 
computers begins in an exponential manner, levels out and eventually decays with the proper injection of 
response.  
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Figure 2-3. Infection and Saturation           Figure 2-4. Infection and Recovery 
 
Non-linear differential equations are used to model attack dynamics. The Epidemiological model derived from 
non-linear differential equations [1] can be represented by the equation:   
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where )(tn  is the fraction of infected nodes, d  is the infection or “death” rate, β  is the recovery or “re-birth” 
rate, 0n is the total number of vulnerable machines.    
 
The Analytical Active Worm Propagation, AAWP, [6], gives a better estimate than Epidemiological modeling 
and can be mathematically represented as a difference equation: 
[ ] ( )[ ],/1111 tnsttt TnNnsn −−−+=+  
where tn  is the fraction of infected nodes at time st,  is the scan rate, N  is the total number of vulnerable 
machines and T  is the address space the worm scans. The infection rate of the worm is proportional to the 
scanning rate. Random scanning has the searching ability to identify IP addresses to attack in a random order, 
localized scanning has the ability to attack targets that reside on the same subnet, hit list scanning has a list of 
targets to attack, permutation scanning uses a fixed pseudorandom permutation of IP addresses to attack and 
topological scanning uses the information stored in the victim’s machine to attack the next target [1 & 2]. Worms 
that use localized scanning, like the Code Red II worm, spread at a slower rate than a worm that employs random 
scanning but has the capacity to penetrate firewalls.  
 
3. Systems Accuracies 
An IDS can generate four possible scenarios in an anomaly detection process. There are two types of incorrect 
detections an IDS can arrive at—falsely detecting actual intrusion and truly detecting false intrusion. Figure 3-1 
below summarizes all possible scenarios when IDS is at work. A good IDS must reduce these false scenarios at 
any cost.   
 
      Intrusion is: 
  Actual False 
Detection is:   Actual IDS works False alarm 
 False IDS did not work IDS works 
Figure 3-1. An Extent of IDS is at Work 
 
From the theorem of total probability, and granted that K,, 21 AA  form a partition of the sample space, ,S  we 
have, for an event ,B  ).()|()(
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 for any event iA  in the partition .,, 21 KAA  This result is known as 
Bayes’ theorem [3]. This presents the relationship between the conditional probabilities of various events 
involved in calculation of probabilities for common intrusion detection scenarios. Let us assume Table 3-1 of 
information for calculation of these probabilities.  
 
Table 3-1. An IDS is at Work with Numbers 
      Intrusion is: 
 
Given that an IDS finds that there is an intrusion, what is the probability that it is in fact an intrusion? Note that 
there are only two events, 1A  and 2A  which correspond to the intrusion being an actual intrusion and a false 
alarm, respectively. The event B  denotes that the intrusion is not being detected. Also, .12 AA =  We want to 
evaluate ),|( 1 BAP  the probability that an intrusion has taken place, given that the IDS finds it is a false alarm. 
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Many statistical models for intrusion detection stemmed from the operational, mean and standard deviation, 
multivariate (regression), Markov processes, and time series models [4]. Randomness is the basis for these 
models to exist; it perhaps represents one of the strangest challenges whose presence is successfully explored 
only by statistics tied to observable variables. The attempt of this section is to elaborate on these models more in-
depth for an average reader. For a random variable X  and n  observations nXXX ,,, 21 K  the statistical 
model determines whether the subsequent observation 1+nX  is a potential intrusion with respect to the previous 
n  observations. The IDS provides tools to detect intrusion for the information assurance community based on 
the model under consideration. Knowledge-based intrusion systems collect knowledge about network attacks, 
examine network traffic and attempt to identify any patterns that indicate a suspicious activity has occurred. This 
merely applies against patterns of known attack and uses them to update the knowledge base frequently [5].    
  
4. Mean and Standard Deviation Model 
This operational model is primarily based on the assumption that intrusions can be decided by comparing a new 
observation of X against the previous n  number of observations. This model can be applicable to metrics where 
experience shows that certain characteristics are frequently linked with attempted intrusions. An example is that 
an event counter is setup for the number of password failures during a brief period to suggest that a break-in has 
been successful. Another example is that personalities of the user such as the user first reads his e-mails, reply 
them before visit the file folders regardless of other network activities. Recovery of history sheds light on these 
types of anomaly detection for operational model. On the other hand, models based on statistical measures such 
as means and standard deviations provide a wide range of information for intrusion detection. It is often 
desirable to obtain an interval of values likely to contain the actual value of the unknown parameter. We then 
insist that the proposed interval contains the value with predetermined high probability called the level of 
confidence. This model is based on the assumption that all what we know about nXXX ,,, 21 K  are mean and 
standard deviation as given by 
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 A new observation 1+nX  is 
  Actual False Total 
Detection is:   Actual 30 25 55 
 False 23 32 55 
 Total 53 57 110 
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defined to be an intrusion if it falls outside a confidence interval 
n
s
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a )%1( α−  degree of confidence. The symbol 2/αt  denotes the −t value having an area of 2/α  to its right 
under the −t curve with degrees of freedom (df) equals .1−n  When data are grouped in a frequency 
distribution, we use the computing formulas, 
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where iX  denotes class midpoint, if  denotes class frequency, and )( ∑= ifn  denotes the sample size, to 
determine the mean and standard deviation for this confidence interval procedure. The basic assumptions for this 
procedure require that observations come from a normal population or a large sample and observations are 
gathered at random. Table 4-1 sums up the results of relevant parameter estimations.  
 
Table 4-1. A Summary of Parameter Estimations  
Assumption Parameter to be Estimated Confidence Interval at 
)%1001( α−  level 
2σ  known µ  
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We now provide an example to show how these calculations are carried out using a relatively small data set. 
Other cases of parameter estimations cited follow similarly. 
 
Suppose a signal is transmitted from a piece of network equipment to a receiver is normally distributed with 
mean µ  and variance, .42 =σ  in order to avoid possible error, the same signal is sent 9 times repeatedly. 
These independent values are measured as 5, 8.5, 12, 15, 7, 9, 7.5, 6.5, 10.5. We now construct a 95% 
confidence interval for .µ  Clearly, .99/81 ==X  From Table 2, a 95% confidence interval for µ  is 
( ).31.10,69.7   If the variance is unknown, then the sample variance, ,2s  can be calculated from the sample 
data and estimations are calculated using the −t distribution. There can be instances in which the data points 
themselves contributed to outliers. They can be eliminated using the interval, 
( ),)IQR(5.1),IQR(5.1 31 +− QQ  where 1Q  and 3Q  be the quartiles and .IQR 13 QQ −=  Other aspects 
of these calculations are found in any standard statistics text [6]. 
 
5. Point and Interval Estimations 
Generally, estimations can be two-fold in this regard. In point estimation, we look for a single value for the 
unknown parameters. However, for the confidence interval estimations, a range of values are proposed giving 
lower and upper limits of the interval. The interval estimations can be based on the three-standard deviation rule, 
a given confidence level, or Γ. ,  the gamma function. The interval estimation based on Γ. ,  the gamma 
function is found in [7]. 
It is essential for forecasting future intrusions of the network, primarily from past data available from statistical 
forecasting techniques. The fact that the attacks occurred during a sequence of time periods are random variables. 
Let ,  	, ⋯ be a sequence of random variables having the expected values, ,  	,  ⋯ which may or 
may not be independently and identically distributed, according to a given probability distribution. There are 
several potential forecasting procedures that can be used in the case of intrusions, which are listed below [8].   
a) Last values: Let  be the forecast for subsequent periods. For this estimation, the last value may be used 
as the possible evaluation in this method so that this estimator is  =  .  Obviously, this estimating 
technique is disadvantageous because it yields a large variance as a result of selecting a sample of size 1. 
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b) Average: This average may be chosen to be ∑ ==
t
i
i
t
t
x
XE
1
)(ˆ  and can be a better estimator if the process 
is entirely stable. The use of a large amount of data can cause occasional shifts, when a reasonable 
estimation is desired.  
c) Moving average: This estimation only uses the relevant recent data for the last periods, but is updated 
periodically placing more weight on   compared to  .   Accordingly, the estimator is 
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d) Exponential smoothing: This is, in fact, the weighted sum of the last observation and the one before using 
the smoothing constant, ,  0 <   < 1. As such, the recursive relationship  =  + 1 −   
can be expressed alternatively as  =  + 1 −  + 1 − 		 + ⋯. Thus, the variance 
calculated to be, Var  = 

 !
!
. The choice of   determines the number of observations taken into 
consideration.  
e) Exponential smoothing adjusted for trend: Let us assume that  follows a linear model with the slope " 
(a trend factor). The expected rate of findings can be either increasing or decreasing. The estimator is 
 =  + 1 − # + "$. Since " is not generally known, it is estimated once again by using 
exponential smoothing to obtain " = %# − $ + 1 − %",  where 0 < % < 1  and 
% ≠    is becoming another smoothing constant.  Accordingly, the new estimator of  is  =
 + 1 − # + "$. 
 
If X  is a random variable with mean µ  and variance ,2σ  then Chebyshev's inequality states, for any value 
,0>×= σdk ),||:( kXXP ≥− µ  the probability of a value falling outside this interval is at most 2/1 d . 
Note also that null occurrences should be included so as not to make the data biased. If X  is the standard 
normal random variable and then, ]||:[ tXXE <− µ  is a strictly decreasing function for the nonnegative 
values of t  [9]. This model is applicable to event counters, interval timers, and resource measures accumulated 
over a fixed time interval or between two related events. This model has several advantages over an operational 
model. The standard normal CDF table [10] facilitates computation of probability in order to decide if 1+nX  has 
been an intrusion. Table 5-1 gives some crude estimates using three probabilistic principles in terms of the 
number of observations within a few standard deviations ( s ) measured from either side of the sample mean 
( ).x   
 
Table 5-1. Estimates for the Number of Observations in a Data Set 
Intervals Proposed Three-Standard-Deviations Rule The Empirical Rule 
 
Chebychev’s Rule 
%100.
1
1
2

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),( sxsx +−  
 
--† 
 
68.26% 
 
-- 
 
 
).2,.2( sxsx +−  
 
-- 
 
95.44% 
 
75.00% 
 
 
).3,.3( sxsx +−  
 
Almost all the observations 
 
99.74% 
 
88.89% 
 
† no estimates are available 
 
This model can be slightly modified placing greater weights on more recent values of the observations. For 
example, if nωωω ,,, 21 K  are positive weights such that nωωω <<< K21  and ∑ =
i
i ,1ω  then we 
consider the sequence, nn XXX ωωω ,,, 2211 K  for the determination of mean and standard deviation of the 
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model. 
 
6. Multivariate Model 
Statistical modeling and data mining are two techniques that enable understanding and potentially identifying 
recurring events. This performance analysis examines trends and data considering the timeline of the event to 
determine statistically significant trends, both positive and negative, and the relationships among elements of an 
event using multivariate analysis. By establishing control or trend charts with confidence limits, these tools 
determine if an unusual behavior is present or has been attempted. This model is similar to the mean and 
standard deviation model except that it is based on correlations among two or more variable metrics. 
Experimental data shows that it is useful for better discriminating power obtained from combinations of related 
measures rather than individually and session elapsed time to look for any significant deviation of the trends [4].  
6.1 Multiple Regression 
Briefly, the purpose of multiple regression is to determine the relationship between the independent variable and 
the dependent variables. A more specific purpose of this technique is to investigate the importance of each 
independent variable to the dependent variable [11]. More specifically, this technique allows for the possibility 
to determine which predictor variable is most important, and which one is the least important. In this section, we 
extend the regression model to include more than one predictor variable. Thus, the general form of a linear 
equation with two independent variables is simply an extension of bivariate regression that can be written as 
,ˆ 2211 xbxbay ++= where 
 yˆ = the predicted value for the dependent variable y  
 a = intercept constant 
 b1 and b2 = regression coefficients (weights) for independent variables one and two 
 x1 and x2 = values for the two independent variables 
In theory, the multiple regression equation could be extended to include an infinite number of predictors, but in 
practice (because of computational difficulties) it is perhaps prudent to limit one’s analysis to a few variables. 
The multiple regression equation stipulates that the predicted value of y is a linear combination of an intercept 
constant, plus independent variables that are weighted by regression coefficients. Regression analysis yields the 
best-fitting values of coefficients using the least squares criterion that the sum of squared error terms (the 
differences between y and predicted value of yˆ ) are kept at minimum. This technique is often referred to as the 
least squares-method subjected for much of the analysis.  
6.2 Regression Model for Scoring Function 
NETADs (Network Traffic Anomaly Detectors), such as PHADs (Packet Header Anomaly Detectors), detect 
anomalies in network packets [12]. A possible statistical model for quantities involved in the evaluation of 
NETAD anomaly scores for a packet; this can be expressed by 
),256//(/)256/1(NETAD rftrrtn ii ++−∑= α  where r  is the size of values (up to 256 for 
NETAD), t  is the time since the attribute was last anomalous (during either training or testing), αn  is the 
number of training packets from the last anomaly to the end of training period, and if  is the frequency in 
training. The summation is taken over all possible subset/attribute combinations. Table 6-1 shows the number of 
attacks detected from 20 to 5000 false alarms using various anomaly scoring functions as appeared in [13]. 
 
 Table 6-1. Factors Related to Scoring Function [10] 
Scoring Function rtn /  rtn /α   rrtn /)256/1( −α   )1/( +ii ft   )256//( rft ii +  NETAD 
20 56 56 60 33 78 66 
50 78 89 92 52 115 97 
100 104 118 120 81 127 132 
500 141 148 149 130 142 148 
5000 157 152 152 158 156 152 
 
The relationship between the scoring functions and rtn / is derived for values in Table 6-1.  
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Figure 6-1. Graph of Scoring Function vs. rtn /  
 
This shows that the scoring function satisfies the relation 4429.9)FunctionScoringln(624.18/ +×=rtn  
with a strong correlation coefficient. It is evident that the increase of scoring function beyond a certain value will 
not increase the α/tn  so rapidly. That is, α/tn  slows down as it reaches higher values of the scoring function 
as in Figure 6-1. In many situations, the response variable is not a linear function of the input function. In such 
cases, the determination of a relationship is possible by a change of variables to transform it into a linear form.  
6.3 Data Warehouse and Model Generator 
For misuse of detection problems, the Support Vector Machine (SVM) model classifies the network activity as 
normal, or as belonging to one of the four categories of attack, namely, probe, dos, u2r, and r2l, where the letter 
“a” in parentheses is used to indicate if they are actual, and “p” is used to indicate the predicted values. The 
misuse classification results are summarized in Table 6-2 for detection dataset obtained [14]. 
 
Table 6-2. Confusion Matrix on DARPA Intrusion  
Actual (a)/ 
Predicted (p)   
normal (p) probe (p)  dos (p) u2r (p)           r2l (p) 
normal (a) 59332  1048  45  57  111 
probe (a) 602  3251  212  62  39 
dos (a) 7393  88  222288  75  9 
u2r (a) 178  1  8  33  8 
r2l (a) 14683  41  7  31  1427 
 
Table 6-3. Correlation Matrix (Actual vs. Predicted) 
 Category normal (p) probe (p)  dos (p) u2r (p)           r2l (p) 
normal (a) 1     
probe (a)  -0.05389 1    
dos (a) -0.20494 -0.31953 1   
u2r (a)           0.102886 0.382839 0.686313 1  
r2l (a) 0.023286 -0.32087 -0.27926 -0.59802 1 
 
Table 6-3 is the correlation matrix for actual and predicted misuses of detection for the data summary of 
independent and dependent variables. The most important aspect to notice from this table is that no bivariate 
correlation is greater than 0.686. We are safe to conclude that the analysis is free of any possible 
multicollinearity effects. Those interested to find out more about SPSS features to test for multicollinearity can 
refer to [9]. A negatively correlated pair of items in a detection dataset indicates that if actual values increase, 
then predicted values decrease and vice versa [15]. 
The detection rate and false positive rate have been obtained for some varying thresholds for the determination 
of the system’s accuracy [16]. The detection rate is the percentage of attack records correctly identified. The 
false positive rate is the percentage of normal records misdiagnosed as anomalous. The threshold is the value 
that determines if a record is normal or if it is a possible attack. Table 6-4 below includes a sample of the varying 
threshold and corresponding false positive rate and the detection rate. We establish confidence intervals for 
threshold, false positive rate, or detection rates and other descriptive statistics with a 95% degree of confidence.  
 
  
Scoring Function vs. tn/r
y = 18.624Ln(x) + 9.4429
R2 = 0.9221
0
50
100
150
200
0 2000 4000 6000
Scoring Function
tn
/r
Scoring
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Table 6-4. A Sample of Varying Threshold vs. False Positive and Detection Rates [16] 
Threshold  False Positive Rate (%)  Detection Rate (%)  
-1.08307  0.790142  0.373533  
-1.08233  0.828005  0.480256  
-1.07139  1.54441  0.533618  
-0.968913  1.65734  1.17396  
-0.798767  3.58736  3.89541  
-0.79858  3.63784  5.60299  
-0.798347  3.68999  6.77695  
-0.767411  3.72054  6.83031  
-0.746663  4.35691  7.47065  
-0.746616  4.63025  8.00427  
-0.71255  8.34283  20.9712  
-0.712503  8.75201  22.0918  
 
Regression models have been obtained for these variables [17]. We draw attention to the descriptive statistics 
that are naturally a focus in every preliminary study for these three variables in Table 6-5. A correlation matrix 
provides significant evidence to conclude that there are strong correlations among the variables in the study as 
summarized in Table 6-6. 
  
Table 6-5. Descriptive Statistics for Threshold, False Positive, and Detection Rate 
 Threshold False Positive Rate (%) Detection Rate (%) 
Mean  -0.85726   3.79480   7.01708 
Standard Error   0.04306   0.74782   2.12850 
Median  -0.79846   3.66392   6.18997 
Standard Deviation   0.14916   2.59053   7.37333 
Sample Variance   0.02225   6.71086 54.36600 
Kurtosis  -1.26349   0.29767   1.10407 
Skewness  -0.78960   0.89255   1.37868 
Range   0.37057   7.96187 21.71827 
Minimum  -1.08307   0.79014   0.37353 
Maximum  -0.71250   8.75201 22.09180 
Sum -10.28714 45.53763 84.20495 
Count 12 12 12 
Largest(1)  -0.71250   8.75201 22.09180 
Smallest(1)  -1.08307   0.79014   0.37353 
Confidence Level (95.0%)   0.09477   1.64595   4.68479 
 
Table 6-6. Correlation Matrix for Threshold, False Positive, and Detection Rate  
  Threshold  False Positive Rate (%)  Detection Rate (%)  
Threshold  1   
False Positive Rate (%)  0.838230425 1  
Detection Rate (%)  0.750245026 0.983370245 1 
 
False alarm and detection rates over 50 users and the tradeoff between false alarms and detection ability as 
functions of the offset have also been considered [18]. Control charts can be generated under simulated scenarios 
to provide explicit details of a charting procedure for future work and draw any long-term conclusions that 
determine the relationship between the variables. 
 
7. Markov Process Model  
A probabilistic prediction model identifies the last system identification given all the previous system 
identifications in the detection of the traffic anomaly are known. From this, the prediction model is same as 
finding probability, ],,,|[ 211 nn XXXXP K+  [19]. Let }1:{ NiX i ≤≤ denote the traffic measurement in 
time series and let W  denote the number of samples for the averaging process. The given trace }{ iX  is now 
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extended to a series of pairs )},{( ii XX with ∑
−
−=
=
11 i
Wik
ki X
W
X for .,,1 NWi K+=  For a given time series 
with fast decaying autocorrelation function, the average values iX  will be rather good estimators of the sample 
mean and will be almost the same for all values of i  [20]. Hence, this additional category contains no 
information and is of very limited value with respect to a better characterization of the sample correlations. 
However, in the presence of a slowly decaying autocorrelation function, the values iX  are significant and 
represent the cumulated averaged history of .iX  The series of pairs consists of W  samples less than the 
original time series [18]. This model, which applies only to event counters, regards each distinct type of event 
(audit record) as a state variable, and uses a state transition matrix to characterize the transition frequencies 
between states. A new observation is defined to be an intrusion if its probability as determined by the previous 
state and the transition matrix is too low. This model might be useful for looking at transitions between certain 
commands where command sequences were important [21]. Whenever the intrusion attempt is to occur in state 
,i  there is a fixed probability ijp  that will be in state .j  Let E  be a finite or countable set. Let )( ijpP =  be a 
stochastic EE×  matrix, so that, for ,, Eji ∈  we have ∑
∈
=≥
Ek
ikij pp .1,0  Letµ  be a probability measure 
on E  [22]. We know that there exists a triple ),,( µPFΩ  carrying a Markov chain ):( +∈= ZnZZ n  such 
that 
nn iiiiinn
ppiZiZiZiZP
1100
),;;;( 221100 −===== KK µ  holds. We write ‘a.s., '
µP  to signify 
‘almost surely relative to the −µP measure’. Let ),,,,(: 10 nn ZZZF Kσ=  then (a.s., ),
µP  
,)|( 1 jZnn npFjZP ==+
µ
 where nF  is the natural filtration [23]. 
 
8. Time Series Model 
The time series model assumes no conditions in the analysis. It compares the parameters collected over an 
extended period of time with the current parameters to monitor unusual features, namely, trends, seasonal effects, 
cycles, and irregularities of the prevailing data.  
This model uses an interval timer together with an event counter or resource measure, that takes into account the 
order and inter-arrival times of the observations nXXX ,,, 21 K , as well as their values. A new observation 
considers an attempted intrusion if its probability of occurring at that time is considerably small. A time series 
model has the advantage of measuring trends of behavior over time and detecting gradual but significant shifts in 
behavior, but the disadvantage is that it is more costly compared to other existing models. Furthermore, when the 
parameters describing the series do not change over time, the time series sometimes can be modeled adequately 
by using what is called the multiplicative decomposition model that exhibits trends, seasonal effects, and other 
features of the series [24]. 
The multiplicative decomposition model is ,ttttt IRCLSNTRy ×××=  where ty  is the observed value of 
the time series in time period t  and other components (factors) represent trends, seasonal, cyclic, and irregular 
components in time period ,t  respectively. First, the time series is plotted using any available data for a given 
network. A cyclical component refers to repeating up and down movements around trend levels (for example 
that revolve around the business cycle.)  
 
Journal of Information Engineering and Applications                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5782 (print) ISSN 2225-0506 (online) 
Vol.3, No.9, 2013 
 
38 
 
Figure 8-1. Trends, Seasonalties, Cyclicties and Irregularities  
 
These fluctuations can last anywhere from smaller to longer periods as measured from peak to peak or trough to 
trough. The two trend lines drawn in Figure 8-1 differ substantially to indicate that there has been heavy traffic 
volume during that time period. Seasonality has not been a question. Cyclic features remain the same, whereas 
some irregularities are present at the beginning and end of the time period monitored.  
 
 
Figure 8-2. Deviation Plot from Comparison 
 
The deviations have been computed for all values of time variable. This has resulted in the deviation plot appears 
in Figure 8-2. The extremes reflect that potential anomalies may have occurred. 
 
Another tool available in the arsenal is the chi-square goodness-of-fit test. It is a hypothesis test which can be 
used to make inferences about the distribution of a variable from the information collected from a sample data to 
decide whether the distribution in question differs from that of a known population. A sample of user activities 
on a suspected computer network is analyzed to determine whether activity pattern differs from the activities 
previously recorded in the network. The network activity patterns in a computer system are recoded through a 
stream of audit events to make this determination. One advantage of this procedure is that it is a robust test [21]. 
 
9. Conclusions and Future Work 
Citing brief notes from several articles and presenting a set of statistical models followed by some analytical 
discussions, we were able to present a set of probabilistic methods and statistical models for network traffic 
anomaly detection. A more comprehensive procedure and formalism for the determination of the normal profile 
is always necessary. It is important to investigate whether or not other scenarios may have occurred. A decent 
survey in which the scope of current research extensively documented is provided in [25]. Discretization 
methods convert the numeric time series to symbolic time series for the method of additional knowledge 
discovery [26 & 27]. However, at present, analyses on multivariate data rather than univariate data are performed 
to detect anomalies as they do not have a strong signature in any of the time series of individual features [28]. 
Other statistical models of this type are there to address the anomaly detection, for example, models that use 
more than the first two moments (e.g., )(),( 2XEXE ) but less than the full set of values. If the determination 
is done on the basis of function of random variables, the method of statistical differentials can be used to 
evaluate the first two moments as discussed [29]. Parameter estimation is the key in some of the models. Much 
focus has been given to estimation based on confidence interval. The maximum likelihood methods and the 
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Bayesian approach are two other well-known parameter estimation methods that can be used as well. Simulation 
has been used in the literature for determination of parameters for these models. However, one should also note 
that the limitations and difficulties of first generation of attacks could prompt the attacker to search for new 
techniques to devise and execute more harmful attacks to computer network [30].   
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